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WARRANTLESS NSA SURVEILLANCE AND
THE ENHANCED EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY PROVIDED BY ENCRYPTED
VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL
DAVID ALAN JORDAN *
Abstract: Information to, from, and about U.S. persons routinely conies
into the possession of the National Security Agency (the "NSA")
through the lawful warrantless surveillance of foreign persons abroad.
The NSA's internal administrative guidelines allow such information to
be disseminated to law enforcement if it evinces any criminal conduct
on the part of the U.S. person. This information may therefore be used
to initiate domestic criminal investigations against U.S. citizens and
other protected persons despite the fact that no warrant authorized the
initial surveillance. The NSA's guidelines contain no qualification as to
the type of criminal offense that may be revealed, and no consideration
of the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Using encrypted
Internet telephony as an example, this Article proposes a change to the
NSA's internal guidelines that would prevent dissemination of informa-
tion gained through the frustration of the reasonable privacy expecta-
tions of protected persons unless exigent circumstances or serious
threats to national security were presented.
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The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead language. .
"It is not an inconvenience to be somehow weighed' against the claims of
police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part of our ma-
chinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the 'well-
intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous'executive officers' who are a part of
any system of law enforcement."
—United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith) (Powellj.) 1
INTRODUCTION
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times published a front-
page story revealing the existence of a secret executive order issued by
President George W. Bush in the months following the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.2 According to the article,
the executive order authorizes the National Security Agency (the
"NSA") to conduct electronic surveillance on U.S. citizens and per-
manent residents inside the United States without first obtaining a
warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as man-
dated by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"). 5
This appears to be a stark departure from the law governing domestic
surveillance,4
 and it raises serious constitutional questions about the
limits of presidential power in times following national emergencies. 5
1 407 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1972) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481
(1971)).
2 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
3 Id.; see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2518, 2519, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811,
1821-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-1862, 1871 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)) [hereinafter FISAJ,
amended by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, 118 Stat. 3638.
4 See U.S. Dept of Defense, Reg. No. 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of
DOD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons, I C5.1.2.1 (Dec. 1982) [hereinaf-
ter DoD Reg. No. 5240.1-R], available at littp://wssrw.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/
pdf/52401r 1282/p52401r.pclf ("A [Department of Defense] intelligence component may
conduct electronic surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence and coun-
terintelligence purposes only pursuant to an order by a judge of the court pursuant to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 . or pursuant to a certification of the At-
torney General issued under the authority of Section 102(a) of the Act.") (citation omit-
ted) (emphasis added).
5
 President Bush's secret executive order allowing warrantless domestic surveillance of
U.S. citizens almost certainly violates the law as it currently stands. See ELIZABET11 B. BAZAN
& JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY '1'0
CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf  (provid-
ing a detailed analysis of President Bush's executive order allowing domestic wiretapping
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The current situation is returning FISA to the spotlight, and
many of the Act's more controversial provisions are being reexam-
ined.° FISA was passed in order to provide the executive branch with a
quick and secure means of satisfying the Fourth Amendment's war-
rant requirement for domestic investigations related to foreign intel-
ligence and counterterrorism. 7 The Act primarily controls the gov-
ernment's surveillance of domestic communications involving U.S.
without a court order and concluding that courts likely will find the program to he incon-
sistent with federal law); Letter from Curtis A. Bradley, Richard & Marcy Horvitz Professor
of Law, Duke Univ., et al., to the Honorable Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, et al.
( Jan. 9, 2006), available at Intp://www.cdt.org/security/200601091egalexpertsanalysis.pdf
(concluding that President Bush's executive order is unlawful); see also FISA, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1809(a) (2000) ("A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally engages in electronic
surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute ...."); Authorization for
Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1541 note (2000 & Supp. III 2003)) ("[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of interna-
tional terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.")
(emphasis added); Keith, 407 U.S. at 321 (reasoning that the CIA may not. conduct (tomes-
tic surveillance for national security purposes without a warrant); Katz v..United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("'Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,' and that searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . . .") (quoting United States v, Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (citation omitted)); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Sei-
zure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (reasoning that the President's
authority to protect national security is at its lowest ebb whenever the President seeks to act
in violation of an act of Congress); Tom Daschle, Editorial, Power We Didn't Grant, WAsn.
Pos'r, Dec. 23, 2005, at A2I (stating that not only did Congress not intend the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force (the "AUMF") to allow warrantless surveillance within the
United States, but also that such broad domestic authority was specifically requested prior
to the AUMF's passage and that request was denied).
6 See Mark Moller, Untwist the Chain of Command, LEGAL. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, available
at futp://www.lawcom/jsp/dc/PubArticleDCjsp?id=1141047297225 (detailing various
perspectives on the procedural framework established under FISA); see also Jerry Crim-
mins, NSA Wiretaps Debated at U of Chicago, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 1, 2006, at 1 (detailing
a discussion held at the University of Chicago Law School between University of Chicago
Law Professor Geoffrey R. Stone and Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner regarding
warrantless NSA surveillance and the efficacy of F1SA's provisions); Patricia Manson, Bar
Group to Debate Curbs on Federal Surveillance Activities, CHL DAILY L. Butt., Feb. 10, 2006, at
I (stating that U.S. Representative Heather Wilson, R-N.M., had called for a full review of
the NSA warrantless domestic surveillance program and mentioning the possibility of new
legislation that would amend FISA's provisions).
7 S. REP. No. 95-604, at 15 (1977); see also Susan Goering, An Unnecessary Breach of Law,
BALI'. SUN, Dec. 21, 2005, at 19A (discussing the compliant nature of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court, and stating that out of the 18,747 warrant petitions received by
the court from 1979 to 2005, only four were rejected).
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citizens or permanent residents;8 it does not limit electronic surveil-
lance of any communications between aliens outside the United
States. 9
 The NSA may freely surveil such conversations with virtually
no limitations under U.S. law.'°
FISA maintains a strict distinction between purely domestic calls
between U.S. persons, and purely foreign communications between
non-U.S. persons outside the United States." Surveillance of the for-
mer always requires approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court, whereas surveillance of the latter never requires such
approval. 12
 A substantial gray area exists when calls are placed from
within the United States to non-U.S. persons abroad. Non-U.S. per-
sons outside the United States may be freely surveilled by the NSA
without even a FISA warrant; therefore, when an unidentified U.S.
person places a call to an alien outside the United States who is being
surveilled by the NSA lawfully without a warrant, the NSA then auto-
matically and inadvertently surveils that U.S. person. In such a situa-
tion, serious questions arise as to the extent to which information
8 FISA's provisions require the government to obtain a FISA warrant when seeking to
surveil a "United States person." A U.S. person is defined as a U.S. citizen, a permanent
resident, a corporation incorporated in the United States, or an unincorporated associa-
tion consisting of mostly U.S. citizens or permanent residents. FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(1)
(2000).
9 FISA does not apply to surveillance activities conducted outside the United States.
Title I of FISA contains all of the Act's substantive provisions and is titled, "Electronic Sur-
veillance Within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes." FISA, Pub. L. No. 95-
511, §§ 101-111, 92 Stat. 1783, 1783-96 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2000 & Stipp.
III 2003)) (emphasis added). In addition, the term "electronic surveillance" is defined
wider the Act so as to exclude surveillance activities that take place outside the United
States. FISA § 101, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
'" The Fourth Amendment does not place any restraints on the power of the govern-
ment to surveil non-U.S. persons outside the United States. United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990) (holding that aliens outside U.S. territory are not
entitled to any protection tinder the Fourth Amendment).
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (defining "United States person" as "a citizen of the
United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, ... an unincorporated
association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated
in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a for-
eign power").
FISA allows non-U.S. persons to be surveilled in the United States without a FISA
warrant based solely upon certification by the Attorney General. See FISA, 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1802(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005). If, however, there is a substantial likelihood that a
U.S. person's communication will be surveilled in the course of these efforts, the govern-
ment must seek approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. See FISA, 50
U.S.C. § 1802(b); see also FISA, 50 U.S.CA. § 1804 (detailing the requirements for FISA
warrant applications).
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gained from such efforts may be used subsequently against that U.S.
person.
The NSA's attempt to answer these questions can be found in the
agency's minimization procedures, which arc detailed in United States
Signals Intelligence Directive 18 ("USSID 18"). 13 Under most circum-
stances, the directive requires the NSA to destroy information gained
inadvertently from unsuspecting U.S. persons without a warrant; 14
however, section 7.2(c) (9) allows the agency to disseminate such "inad-
vertently acquired" information to U.S. law enforcement if it appears to
implicate the U.S. person in criminal conduct. 15
This Article discusses this loophole in light of recent advance-
ments in encrypted Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") technology.
It concludes that the minimization procedures set forth in USSID 18
are constitutionally deficient because they fail to take into account the
growing expectation of privacy that has resulted from advancements
in encryption technology. The directive should be redrafted to man-
date greater consideration of an individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy when determining how information collected without a
warrant may be disseminated and used by the agency.
This Article is comprised of four parts. Part I provides an expla-
nation of the NSA and its signals intelligence activities. 16 Part II dis-
cusses the legal framework for the electronic surveillance operations
of the NSA and explains the loophole that allows the agency to seize
and analyze international communications made by U.S. citizens
without a warrant." Part III examines encrypted Internet telephony,
cryptanalysis, and the territorial limits of constitutional rights. 18 Part
IV discusses the constitutionality of section 7.2 (c) (4) of USSID 18 as
applied to encrypted Internet telephony. 19 The Article then con-
cludes by proposing that communication via encrypted Internet te-
lephony offers the user such a reasonable expectation of privacy that
the Fourth Amendment should extend to prevent dissemination of
information pertaining to U.S. persons gained from the warrantless
13 Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., United Stales Signals Intelligence Directive 18,
( July 27, 1993) [hereinafter USSR/ 18], available at littp://www.gwo.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAF,1313/NSAEBB23/07-02.1mn (declassified version with some language redacted by the
NSA).
14 Id. § 3.1.
15 Id. § 7.2(c) (4).
16 See infra notes 21-50 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 51-144 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 145-191 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 192-232 and accompanying text.
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capture of such communications—except in very limited situations
where truly exigent circumstances exist."
1. BACKGROUND: SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE AND THE NSA
Signals intelligence, or SIGINT, refers to intelligence acquired
through the capture of electronic signals." The term encompasses
three categories of intelligence information: communications intelli-
gence ("COMINT"); electronics intelligence ("ELINT"); and foreign
instrumentation signals intelligence ("FISINT"). 22 The NSA is the
agency responsible for the signals intelligence operations of the
United States." In addition to the initial gathering of signals, SIGINT
operations often involve subsequent cryptanalysis24 which is per-
formed by the Central Security Service (the "CSS")," a component
sub-agency of the NSA that brings together the cryptographic and
cryptanalytic capabilities of the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force."
Although the scope of the NSA's SIGINT operations has always
been the subject of wild speculation, the true number of communica-
tions intercepted by the agency has remained a closely guarded secret.
Speculation about the number of communications intercepted by the
NSA began to grow when rumors of a global signals intelligence net-
work involving multilateral cooperation between several nations be-
20 See infra notes 225-238 and accompanying text.
21 The term "signals intelligence" or "SIGINT" describes the broad practice of intelli-
gence gathering through various electronic means. See U.S. Dept of Defense, Directive No.
5100.20, 1 3.1 (Dec. 23, 1971) (as amended through June 24, 1991), available at http://
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdt2/d510020p.pdf.
22 See id. "Communications intelligence" or "COMINT" is a subset of the broader dis-
cipline of signals intelligence that deals specifically with the capture of encrypted commu-
nications for intelligence purposes. Although "communications intelligence" is probably a
more apt description of the specific type of operations at issue in this Article, the term is
often used interchangeably with "signals intelligence" in common parlance, so I have cho-
sen to use the latter throughout this Article to be certain to cover all relevant NSA opera-
tions.
23 Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 1.12(b) ( I), 3 C.F.R. 200, 208 (1982) ("No other depart-
ment or agency may engage in signals intelligence activities except pursuant to a delega-
tion by the Secretary of Defense ... ."), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (2000).
24 Cryptanalysis is defined as "Wile conversion of encrypted messages into plain text
without having the initial knowledge of the key used in encryption." Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent.
Sec. Serv., Frequently Asked Questions About NSA, littp://www.nsa.gov/about/about00018 .
cfni#18 (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
23 Although the combined National Security Agency and Central Security Service are
often referred to as the NSA/CSS, the two entities will be discussed collectively as the
"NSA" throughout most of this Article For the purpose of simplicity.
26 Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., supra note 24.
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gan to surface in 1988. In that Year, Margaret Newsham, a former con-
tract employee working at the NSA field station in Menwith Hill, York-
shire, England, 27 complained to the U.S. House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence about alleged corruption and impropriety
surrounding the use of the NSA's signals intelligence resources. 28 She
claimed to have witnessed employees of the agency intercepting a
telephone call placed by then-U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond. 29 Her
allegations also included details of a global surveillance system known
as ECHELON." This fueled public interest and a large number of
newspaper articles, but the agency remained silent about the system,
and media coverage fizzled shortly thereafter. 81
In recent years, several high-profile investigative reports have re-
kindled public interest in the ECHELON network. For example, in
2000, the CBS program 60 Minutes aired a feature on the ECHELON
system. 82 The program included an interview with Mike Frost, a former
twenty-year employee of Canada's principal signals intelligence agency,
the Communications Security Establishment (the "CSE")." During the
interview, Frost made revelations about the specific capabilities of the
ECHELON system, stating at one point that the system captures "every-
thing ... from data transfers to cell phones to portable phones to baby
monitors to ATMs."34 Frost had been one of the first insiders to divulge
specifics about the breadth of ECHELON's surveillance capabilities,
and his account helped to spark renewed public interest in the sys-
tem."
27 The NSA's Menwith Hill Station in Yorkshire, England, is rumored to be the largest
signals intelligence facility in the world. 60 Minutes: ECHELON; Worldwide Conversations
Being Received by the ECHELON System May Fall into the Wrong Hands and Innocent People May
Be Tagged as Spies (CBS television broadcast Feb. 27, 2000) [hereinafter 60 Minutes].
2g Duncan Campbell, Making History: The Original Source for the 1988 First ECHE-
LON Report Steps Forward, Feb, 25, 2000, http://cryptome.org/echelon-mndc.htm.
29 Id.
3(1 See id.
31 See generally MIKE FROST, SPYWORLD: INSIDE THE CANADIAN & AMERICAN INTELLI-
GENCE ESTABLISHMENTS (1994) (giving Frost's first account of some of the operations of
Canada's Communications Security Establishment (the "CSE") and the NSA).
32 60 Minutes, supra note 27.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See generally FROST, supra note 31 (offering an account of the operations between the
CSE and the NSA). Although much of the controversy surrounding ECHELON is relatively
recent, multilateral SIGINT collaboration between these nations is nothing new. Their coop-
eration began with the BRUSA COMINT Alliance between the United States and the British
Commonwealth, which was created at the end of World War 11. See Lawrence D. Sloan, Note,
ECHELON and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A Need for Reevaluation, 50 Dutoz, Li.
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News reports concerning the ECHELON system raised concerns
in Europe, and on July 5, 2000, the European Parliament established
a temporary committee toinvestigate. 38 Approximately one year later,
this committee issued its "Report on the Existence of a Global System
for the Interception of Private and Commercial Communications." 37
The report detailed the existence of ECHELON, its legality under
European and international law, and its implications for the privacy
rights of European citizens. 38 Subsequently, the European Union be-
gan seeking ways to counter the effects of ECHELON through en-
hanced encryption protocols. 39
 In 2004, the European Union created
the SECOQC project."° Under the project, the European Union will
spend $11 million on research and development for a new quantum
encryption system that could be used to thwart the signals intelligence
capabilities of ECHELON 4 1
The ECHELON system is rumored to capture as many as three
billion communications each day. 42 The system's reach spans the
globe due to the strategic locations of its five member nations, which
1467, 1471 (2001) (discussing the origins of UKUSA SIGINT cooperation); see also SIMON
CHESTERMAN, SHARED SECRETS: INTELLIGENCE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 22 (Lowy Inst.
Paper No. 10, 2006), available at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=360
(providing a detailed history of UKUSA signals intelligence cooperation); Stephen Fidler &
Mark fluband, A Special Relationship? The US and UK Spying Alliance Is Put Under the Spotlight
FIN. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at 17 (providing additional details about the nature of cooperation
between the NSA and the United Kingdom's Government Communications Headquarters
(the "GCHQ") ).
36 Report on the Existence of' a Global System for the Interception of Private and
Commercial •Communications (ECHELON Interception System), EUR. PARL. Doc. A5-
0264/2001 final (2001) [hereinafter E.U. Report], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
program/process/rapport_echelon_en.pclf.
37 Id.
93 Id.
39 See Philip Willan, E.U. Seeks Quantum Cryptography Response to Echelon, May 17,
2004, http://security.itworld.com/4361/040517euechelon/page_l  .html.
49 SECOQC Stands for Secure Communication Based on Quantum Cryptography.
SECOQC Home Page, http://www.secoqc.net
 (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
41 See CHESTERMAN, supra note 35, at 21 (discussing the European Union's efforts to
secure communications through quantum cryptography); see also Willan, supra note 39,
(discussing the European Union's plans to develop a secure communication system that
would be immune from the interception capabilities of ECHELON). This move by the
European Union seems to be fueling competition between technology firms to develop
new and better forms of data encryption. See R. Colin Johnson, Quantum Encryption Enters
Product Phase, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, May 2, 2005, at 44 (discussing the Infose-
curity Europe 2005 trade show in London, where a new turnkey quantum encryption sys-
tem and other encryption innovations were unveiled).
42 Vernon Loeb, Critics Questioning NSA Reading Habits; Politicians Ask fAgency Sweeps in
Private Data, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1999, at A3.
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include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand." Together, these nations comprise the UKUSA
community, which has its roots in the BRUSA COMINT alliance estab-
lished between the United States and the British Commonwealth dur-
ing World War 11. 44 Through satellite and other means, ECHELON is
believed to be capable of capturing most electronic signals broadcast
anywhere in the world. 45
The NSA has refused to comment on ECHELON, even invoking
attorney-client privilege to avoid compliance with document requests
made by the U.S. House Perinanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence.46 Such actions have fueled speculation by conspiracy theorists, as
well as concern on the part of civil libertarians. 47 Although most esti-
mates about the exact capabilities of ECHELON arc likely exaggerated
by these groups, the amount of data collected by the joint efforts of the
UKUSA community is probably much more substantial than imagined
before the existence of ECHELON came to light. 48 Consequently, due
to the large volume of international communications potentially being
captured by ECHELON, there is a substantial likelihood that a
43 There are five agencies that participate in collective signals operations through the
ECHELON network. They are the United States' NSA, the United Kingdom's GCHQ,
Canada's CSE, Australia's Defence Signals Directorate ("DSD"), and New Zealand's Gov-
ernment Communications Security Bureau ("GCSB"). See CHESTERMAN, supra note 35, at
22; see also Sloan, supra note 35, at 1471 (discussing the global reach of ECHELON that
results from multinational, cooperative intelligence gathering).
44 E.U. Report, supra note 36, at 60-61; see also CHESTERMAN, supra note 35, at 22 (pro-
viding a detailed history of UKUSA signals intelligence cooperation).
4 See E.U. Report, supra note 36, at 34.
46 On August 31, 1999, U.S. Representative Bob Barr (R-Ga.) was interviewed by Fox
News host Bill O'Reilly and was asked about the House Intelligence Committee's attempts
to discover more information about the ECHELON network. He stated that "when the
House Intelligence Committee did ask the NSA for the justification and an explanation of
this program, not only did they refuse to give it to them, but—get this—their rationale was
'We can't give it to you because that's attorney-client privilege.'" The O'Reilly Factor: Unre-
solved Problem: Project ECHELON (Fox News Channel television broadcast Aug. 31, 1999); see
also John C. K. Daly, ECHELON—The Ultimate Spy Network?, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Mar. 1,
2004 (describing the U.S. government's "terse no comment' attitude to all inquiries re-
garding Echelon").
47 Many civil liberties groups have expressed concern over the NSA's reluctance to re-
veal details about the operation of the ECHELON system. After the NSA's refusal to dis-
close documents, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, and the Omega Foundation created EchelonWatch.org , a website dedicated to
tracking the system. See Robert MacMillan, ACLU Plans to Observe Echelon Global Spy Net
Online, NEWSBYTES, Nov. 16, 1999.
See E.U. Report, supra note 36, at 34 ("If UKUSA States operate listening stations in
the relevant regions of the earth, in principle they can intercept all telephone, fax, and
data traffic transmitted via such satellites.").
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significant number of international phone calls made to and from
American citizens were being collected by the NSA even before Presi-
dent Bush issued his secret executive order.° The next Part details the
legal structure that regulates the NSA's signals intelligence efforts and
describes the situations where U.S. citizens might have their conversa-
tions monitored by the agency without a warrant. 50
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING NSA SIGINT OPERATIONS
The NSA's electronic surveillance activities are governed primar-
ily by four authorities: the U.S. Constitution, 51 FISA,52
 Executive Or-
der No. 12,333, 53 and USSID 18.54 The Fourth Amendment and FISA
provide a high degree of protection for U.S. persons inside the
United States and a slightly lower degree of protection for U.S. per-
sons located outside U.S. borders. 55 With the exception of some rules
related to diplomatic personnel, non-U.S. persons located outside the
United States are offered practically no protection from electronic
49
 Even prior to the controversial order, it was possible for the NSA to keep and dis-
seminate information collected about U.S. citizens although no warrant authorized the
initial surveillance. See USSID 18, supra note 13, § 3.1.
50
 See infra notes 51-144 and accompanying text.
51 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
52 See FISA, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511, 2518, 2519, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829,
1841-1846, 1861-1862, 1871 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005).
55 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note
(2000).
54 See USSID 18, supra note 13.
55 Courts have held that the government may use evidence collected by foreign gov-
ernments against U.S. persons at trial in the United States even though such evidence was
collected in a manner that would have violated their constitutional rights if conducted by
U.S. agents. See Stefan Epstein, Annotation, Application of Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule to Evidence Obtained Through Search Conducted by Official of Foreign Government, 33 A.L.R.
FED. 342, § 3(a) (1977) (explaining the general rule that the exclusionary rule does not
apply to searches conducted by foreign governments). This is true even if U.S. agents are
involved with the foreign government's efforts, provided that their participation is not
substantial. See id.; see also Gov't of Canal Zone v. Sierra, 594 F.2d 60, 72 (1979) ("Fourth
Amendment rights are generally inapplicable to an action by a foreign sovereign in its own
territory in enforcing its own laws, even though American officials are present and coop-
erate in some degree."). Also, traffic stops and questioning conducted by U.S. border
officials on U.S. citizens entering and leaving the country have been upheld as constitu-
tional despite the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (holding that the use of fixed border check-
points and the questioning of travelers at U.S. borders do not require warrants or probable
cause). The Supreme Court has also held that the government may hand over an Ameri-
can soldier for trial by a foreign government although U.S. constitutional guarantees will
not be provided. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 530 (1957).
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surveillance by U.S. intelligence agencies. 56 Therefore, international
telephone calls from U.S. citizens inside the United States to foreign
acquaintances abroad could be captured by the NSA without a war-
rant if those foreign • acquaintahces are under NSA surveillance. In
such a situation, the only protections currently afforded to U.S. citi-
zens are found in the minimization procedures mandated by FISA 57
and Executive Order No. 12,333. 55
 The specific minimization proce-
dures applicable to NSA operations are detailed in USSID 18. 59 Each
of the four legal authorities—and the protections they provide—are
discussed individually below.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution lays the foun-
dation for all legal restrictions on the NSA's electronic surveillance
and signals intelligence operations.° It ensures the right of U.S. per-
sons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and man-
dates that no warrants be issued absent a showing of probable cause. 61
Prior to 1967, electronic surveillance was not considered to be a
"search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 52 However, in 1967,
the Supreme Court extended the definition to include electronic sur-
veillance, thereby requiring all government agencies to obtain a war-
rant prior to conducting such surveillance on U.S. persons.°
56
 International law places restrictions on the ability of governments to surveil diplo-
matic missions within their territory. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and
Optional Protocol on Disputes art. 22, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (stat-
ing that the premises of diplomatic missions are inviolable and immune from search). A
host nation may not interfere with the official correspondence of a diplomatic mission. Id.
art. 27. United Nations diplomats and officials are also afforded protection from surveil-
lance under international law. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations art. 2, § 3, Apr. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 u.N.T.s. 16 (providing that the
premises of the United Nations are inviolable and are immune from search); see also
Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 3416, 1 1 U.N.T.S. 11 (same).
sz FISA, 18 U.S.G.A. §§ 2511, 2518, 2519, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829, 1841-
1846, 1861-1862,1871 (West 200] & Stipp. 2005).
58
 Exec. Order No. 12,333, §§ 2.3-2.4, 3 C.F.R. 200, 211-12 (1982), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 401 note (2000).
USSID 18, supra note 13.
69 See U.S. CoNs•r. amend. IV.
61 Id. ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and' seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation ....").
62 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
63 Katz V. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
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The rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are subject to
some important limitations. For example, since World War II, U.S.
presidents have asserted that the executive branch has the power to
order warrantless electronic surveillance when national security is at
stake." This exception has become known as the national security ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment. 65
 Although the exception is not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, caselaw has recognized a
limited set of circumstances under which the President's power to
control foreign affairs may allow warrantless searches to be ordered to
effectuate that purpose. 66
 Courts have, however, allowed the excep-
tion to be invoked only in a limited set of situations, all of which have
involved some form of foreign security effort. 67
 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has specifically refused to recognize the national security
exception in cases involving domestic surveillance operations target-
ing American citizens within U.S. borders.° For instance, in 1972, in
United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), the Supreme Court held that
the President's power to protect national security did not eliminate
the need for the Central Intelligence Agency to obtain a warrant be-
fore conducting electronic surveillance of suspected terrorists within
the territorial boundaries of the United States. 69
 This holding proved
€4 See Michael A. DiSahatino, Annotation, Construction and Application of "National Secu-
rity" Exception to Fourth Amendment Search Warrant Requirement, 39 A.L.R. FED. 646, § 2a
(1978).
65 See id.
66
 See 68 Am. Jolt. 2D Searches and Seizures § 161 (2005); see also United States v. Totten,
92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875) (recognizing the President's power to conduct foreign affairs in-
cludes the power to authorize foreign intelligence operations and the use of clandestine
agents); United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1079 (E.D. Mich. 1971) ("Presidential
power of surveillance is specifically limited to 'exceptional cases'—cases of a non-criminal
nature or which concern the country's national security.").
67 See 68 Am. jun. 2n Searches and Seizures § 161 (2005) ("Generally, there is no clearly
announced 'national security' exception to the requirement of a search warrant. To the
extent there is such an exception, it May only be invoked by the special authorization of
the President or the Attorney General of the. United States. The distinguishing element
between domestic security cases, in which no exception to the warrant requirement exists,
and cases involving foreign security, in which an exception may exist, is whether the activi-
ties of the subject at which the search is directed affCct the foreign relations of the United
States.") (footnotes omitted). Compare United States v. Elirlichrnan, 376 F. Supp. 29, 35
(D.D.C. 1974) (refusing to recognize a broad interpretation of the national security excep-
tion), with United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605-06 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that a
warrant was not required in a case involving surveillance conducted for foreign intelli-
gence purposes, but reasoning that if members of a domestic political organization were
the subject of such surveillance unrelated to foreign affairs, such surveillance would "un-
doubtedly" be illegal).
68 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1972).
69 Id.
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problematic for U.S. intelligence agencies, which feared that seeking
a warrant through traditional avenues would require divulging secret
information about agency methods and ongoing operations." The
Keith Court had, however, specifically refused to address the issue of
whether the agency was required to obtain a traditional warrant in
matters involving foreign powers or agents, 71 which left room for
Congress to step in and create an alternative means of satisfying the
warrant requirement while also protecting classified information."
Accordingly, with FISA's passage in 1978, Congress provided U.S.
agencies with an alternative means of obtaining warrants for foreign
intelligence surveillance operations targeting U.S. persons." Another
purpose of the Act was to prevent abuses by the executive branch,
which had engaged in domestic surveillance of civil rights and antiwar
activists during the Vietnam era." FISA established strict procedural
rules for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence purposes within the United States."
It is important to note that FISA does not apply to foreign surveil-
lance operations that target non-U.S. persons located abroad." FISA
merely provides a procedural framework for satisfying the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment does not ex-
tend protection to non-U.S. persons outside the territorial limits of the
United States. 77 The Supreme Court reiterated and strengthened this
stance in 1990, when it held that the Fourth Amendment does not even
protect against warrantless property seizures by U.S. agents against for-
70 See id. at 319 (quoting a brief for the United States as stating that being required to
obtain search warrants in these cases would require disclosures to magistrates that "would
create serious potential dangers to the national security and to the lives of informants and
agents").
71 In Keith, the Supreme Court held that the government was required to obtain a war-
rant to conduct domestic surveillance related to national security, but it refused to address
the issue of a warrant requirement for foreign cases. Specifically, the Court stated, "this
case involves only the domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed, and
express no opinion as to, the issues which may he involved with respect to activities of for-
eign powers or their agents." Id. aL 321-22.
72 See id.; cf Zweihon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (refusing to ex-
tend the national security exception to allow a warrantless search of people who were not
agents of a foreign power).
75 See S. Rio'. No. 95-604, at 15 (1977),
74 See id.; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 2, at Al.
75 See FISA, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511, 2518, 2519, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829,
1841-1846, 1861-1862, 1871 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005).
76 See 5U U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
77 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990).
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eign nationals abroad. 78 Therefore, there are virtually no constitutional
limits on the ability of the NSA—or any other U.S. agency—to conduct
electronic surveillance or even property seizures on non-U.S. persons
abroad." Consequently, FISA's warrant requirement does not apply to
situations where a non-U.S. person is the target of NSA surveillance
outside the United States, even if U.S. persons may be inadvertently
surveilled as a result."
B. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
FISA applies to all instances of electronic surveillance performed
by government agents within the United States for foreign intelli-
gence purposes. 81 Its procedural framework is distinct from that gov-
erning the conduct of electronic surveillance for general law en-
forcement purposes," which is instead governed primarily by two
other congressional acts: Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title 111") 88 and the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act of 1986 (the "ECPA"). 84 Title III was passed in 1968
in order to regulate surveillance of oral communications. Addition-
ally, in 1986, Congress passed the ECPA, which amended Title III and
extended its scope to cover the new forms of electronic communica-
tion presented by increased computer usage. 85 These two statutes pro-.
vide guidance to U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies seek-
ing to conduct domestic surveillance for law enforcement purposes.
Although some assistance is allowed, the NSA is generally not permit-
74 See id.
See id. (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to physical searches or
seizures against non-U.S. persons located outside the United States); see also United States
v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915-16 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding the warrantless
surveillance of a non-U.S. citizen who was an agent of the Vietnamese government).
8° See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75; Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 915-16.
81 See FISA, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801(1), 1804(a) (7) (B) (West 2001 & Stipp. 2005).
82 See S. Rio'. No. 95-604, at 15 (1977).
a.' Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212-23 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (2000 & Supp. HI 2003)).
84 Pub. L No. 99.508, § 20I(a), 100 Stat. 1848, 1861-63 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2703 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)). Congress passed the ECPA in 1986 in order to
respond to the increasing use of computers to transmit private data and communications.
The advent of the Internet made it necessary to update the previous classifications under
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which had limited the definition
of wire tapping to traditional phone calls. The ECPA extended protection to these elec-
tronic communications. See 132 CONG. Rec. 1-18977 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986) (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier).
85 See 132 CONG. Rm. 118977 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986) (statement of Rep. Kastentneier)
(explaining the purpose of the ECPA).
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ted to conduct signals intelligence operations within the United States
for the purpose of general domestic law enforcement. 86 NSA opera-
tions arc typically confined to foreign intelligence, counterintelli-
gence, or counterterrorism purposes." As a result, the NSA's domes-
tic ECHELON operations are primarily governed by FISA.
Although the NSA is not generally permitted to conduct domestic
surveillance for law enforcement purposes, information about U.S. citi-
zens obtained under a FISA warrant may be used in criminal proceed-
ings against them.88 The information sought to be used need not be
evidence of a crime related to espionage. The only limitation is that the
collection of foreign intelligence information must have been a
"significant" purpose of the FISA surveillance. 89 Prior to the passage of
the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001,9° the collection of foreign intelligence
" USSR/ 18, supra note 13, § 1.4 ("[T]he focus of all foreign intelligence operations is
on foreign entities and persons."). However, NSA assistance to law enforcement is permit,
ted in a limited number of circumstances. See 10 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (permitting the Sec-
retary of Defense to provide law enforcement agencies with information collected by De-
partment. of Defense components if that information is relevant to narcotics trafficking).
ea USSID 18, supra note 13, § 3.1 ("The policy of the (U.S. SIGINT System] is to target
or collect only foreign communications. The USSS will not intentionally collect communi-
cations to, from or about U.S. persons or persons or entities in the U.S. except as set forth
M this 1U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive].").
" See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804(a) (7) (B) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005).
89 Originally, FISA required the collection of foreign intelligence information to be
the primary purpose of FISA-related surveillance. FISA, Pub. L. No. 95-511,
§ 104(a) (7) (B), 92 Stat. 1783, 1789 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (7) (B) (1982)).
However, the USA PATRIOT Act amended this requirement. Under the new language, the
collection of foreign intelligence information need only be a "significant purpose" of the
proposed surveillance for a FISA warrant to be issued. See Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a) (7) (B), 1823(a) (7) (B) (200(1 & Supp. III 2003)). Originally, this new definition
was set to expire on December 31, 2005. Id. § 224, 115 Stat. at 295 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510 note (2000 & Supp. III 2003)), repealed by USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 102, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). Congress
extended this date to March 10, 2006 in order to allow more lime to debate. See Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Key Senators Reach Accord on Extending the Patriot Act, N.Y. Ttmrs, Feb. 10, 2006, at
A14. On March 2, 2006, the Senate voted for a permanent extension to this provision,
making the new language permanent. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Passes Legislation to
Renew Patriot Art, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A14. The House of Representatives voted in
favor of the bill on March 7, 2006. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Patriot Act Revisions Pass House,
Sending Measure to President, N.Y. Timm, Mar. 8, 2006, at A20. President George W. Bush
signed the permanent extension into law on March 9, 2006--just one day before the provi-
sion would have expired. SeeJohn Diamond, Bush Makes Patriot Provisions Permanent, USA
Toimv, Mar. 10, 2006, at 6A; see also USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act.
of 2005 § 102.
88 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-50, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as
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information needed to be the "primary purpose" of FISA surveillance.
Now, it need only be a "significant purpose" of the surveillance in order
for a FISA warrant to be issued. 91 This change drastically increased the
ease with which government agents can obtain domestic surveillance
warrants under FISA.
FISA was intended to govern every instance of electronic surveil-
lance conducted by U.S. agents within the territorial boundaries of
the United States for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence pur-
poses.92 Section 201 (b) of the Act states that FISA "shall be the exclu-
sive means by which electronic surveillance ... and the interception
of domestic wire and oral communications may be conducted." 93 The
Act set forth procedures through which the government may seek
authorization for such surveillance without being required to follow
the traditional warrant procedures mandated by the Fourth Amend-
ment.94 Congress believed this step was necessary to protect sensitive
national security information that might otherwise be revealed under
the traditional warrant issuance framework. 95
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 21
U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C.).
91 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (7) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (stating that applications for
FISA warrants must include a certification by an executive branch official verifying that
"the certifying official deems the information sought to be foreign intelligence informa-
tion" and that "a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence
information").
92 FISA, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(f) (amending the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 to provide that FISA "shall be the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance ... and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communica-
tions may be conducted"). In 1994, PISA was amended to allow the FISC to issue warrants
for physical searches as well as electronic surveillance. See Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, §807(a)(3), 108 Stat. 3423, 3443-44 (1994)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1822 (2000)) (amending FISA to add a new Title III concerning
physical searches, giving the President the power to "authorize physical searches without a
court order . . . to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one year").
93 FISA, § 201(b), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(0.
sa FISA, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (West 2001 & Stipp. 2005) (providing that "the President,
through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order
... to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one year" if certain
conditions are fulfilled and certain procedures are followed).
95 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 15 (1977). For example, when a U.S. intelligence agency
decides to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
purposes, that decision is usually based on classified information. The traditional process
for obtaining a warrant for such searches would almost invariably involve the disclosure of
secret information, which would divulge current intelligence collection efforts and meth-
ods. An alternative to the traditional warrant procedures was necessary to preserve na-
tional security. FISA provided that alternative.
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As part of this procedural framework, FISA established a special
court known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the
"FISC")." This court hears most government requests to conduct "elec-
tronic surveillance" within the United States for foreign intelligence
purposes. 97 The Act also mandated the adoption of minimization pro-
cedures to limit the effects of FISA-authorized surveillance on U.S. per-
sons." FISA does not, however, extend protection to non-U.S. persons
outside the United States.99 Collecting signals information outside U.S.
borders is not considered "electronic surveillance" under the Act's
definition, even if a U.S. person is specifically targeted.m
Although NSA collection efforts under FISA may target only those
suspected of being agents of a foreign government or terrorist organi-
zation, the Act allows the agency to use unrelated information that is
inadvertently acquired about U.S. citizens who are not the proper tar-
96 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000 & Supp. III 2003), amended by Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 'Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1071(e), 118 Stat. 3638,
3691, and USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 106, 120.Stat. 192 (2006); see also United States v. Hammond, 381 F.3d 316, 332 (4th
Cir. 2004) (providing an explanation of the purposes behind F1SA and its procedural
framework). Critics claim that the FISC is merely a rubber stamp for U.S. intelligence and
law enforcement agencies, citing the fact that the court denied zero petitions out of the
11,883 petitions it heard during its firSt twenty-one years of operation. See Helene E.
Schwartz, Oversight of Minimization Compliance Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act:
Flow the Watchdogs Are Doing Their Jobs, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 405, 445 (1981); Sloan, supra note
35, at 1496; see also Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders
1979-2004, http://www.epic.org/privaCy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2006) (demonstrating that from 1979 to 2004, a total of four petitions for FISA warrants
were denied, each in 2003).
97 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
98 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1802(a) (1) (C), 1804(a)(5).
99 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F.
Supp. 2d 264, 287 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing how searches conducted in Kenya are
not governed by FISA).
100 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f). Section 1801(0 of FISA defines four types of conduct
that arc considered "electronic surveillance" under F1SA. Signals collection operations
that target U.S. persons outside the United States do not fit within any of these four
definitions. The first three definitions require the targeted individual to be located inside
of the United States to be considered "electronic surveillance." The fourth definition ap-
plies only to the use of surveillance devices within the United States. Therefore, the NSA's
signals monitoring stations in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
are not regulated by FISA. U.S. personnel located at these foreign stations presumably may
monitor U.S. persons who are outside the United States, and that conduct technically
would not be considered electronic surveillance under FISA's definitions. This highlights
the fact that FISA was meant to govern only domestic surveillance taking place within U.S.
borders. Although such efforts would not fall under FISA's definition of "electronic sur-
veillance," USSID 18's minimization procedures still would apply and offer some protec-
tion to the rights of U.S. persons abroad. See generally USSID 18, supra note 13.
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gets of the surveillance. 1 ° 1 If the NSA wishes to use such information
obtained during FISA-authorized surveillance, it must comply with its
own FISA-related minimization procedures, which are located in Annex
A to USSR) 18. 102 The procedures in Annex A apply only to informa-
tion acquired during domestic FISA surveillance conducted pursuant
to a FISA warrant.'"
Non-FISA surveillance against non-U.S. persons abroad may be
conducted lawfully without a warrant; however, these operations must
still be conducted in a manner that minimizes the impact on the rights
of unintentionally monitored U.S. persons.'" In order to use inadver-
tently acquired information pertaining to U.S. persons gained through
warrantless foreign surveillance, the agency must comply with the mini-
mization procedures mandated by Executive Order No. 12,333 and
Department of Defense Directive 52401 105
101
 Although FISA requires the use of minimization.procedures to limit the impact of
authorized surveillance on U.S. persons who arc not named as targets, the Act specifically
allows evidence of a crime to be disseminated and used by law enforcement. FISA, 50
U.S.C. § 1801(h) (3). Evidence collected pursuant to a valid FISA warrant may be used in
criminal proceedings against persons who were not named in the warrant as targets of the
authorized surveillance. See id. § 1806(g) (stating that a motion to exclude evidence col-
lected pursuant to a FISA warrant shall be denied if the surveillance was lawfully author-
ized and conducted); see also United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300, 1304 (8th Cir. 1991)
("There is no requirement that the `crime' be related to foreign intelligence."); United
States v. Nadia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that evidence collected pur-
suant to a FISA warrant issued against one individual is admissible as evidence against an
acquaintance with whom the individual had spoken during the period of the surveillance).
1 °2 USSID 18, supra note 13, at Annex A, app. 1, § 1 ('These procedures apply to the
acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination of non-publicly available information con-
cerning unconsenting United States persons that is collected in the course of electronic
surveillance as ordered by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court un-
der Section 102(b) or authorized by Attorney General Certification under Section 102(a)
of [FISAJ.").
1°5 Id.
104 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
105
 FISA allows the use of information about any U.S. person that is collected pursuant
to a FISA warrant provided that such use is conducted in accordance with applicable
minimization procedures. Id. § 1806(a). FISA applies only to surveillance conducted inside
the United States. Executive Order No. 12,333 mandated that additional minimization
procedures be implemented in all U.S. intelligence agencies. Exec. Order No. 12,333,
§ 2.3, 3 C.F.R. 200, 211 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (2000). These minimiza-
tion procedures apply to all surveillance regardless of its location. See id. Directive No.
5240.1 is the Department of Defense's implementation of the Order's requirements. U.S.
Dept of Defense, Directive No. 5240.1 (Apr. 1988) [hereinafter DoD Directive No.
5240.1], available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d52401_042588/
d52401p.pdf. Directive 5240.1 applies to all intelligence activities of Department of De-
fense components, including the NSA. See id. Regulation No. 5240.1-R is a detailed regula-
tion that implements Directive No. 5240.1, and this document is tied to a previous version
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C. Executive Order No. 12,333
The lawfully warrantless foreign surveillance activities of the NSA
that are not governed by FISA are governed by Executive Order No.
12,333. 106 President Ronald Reagan issued the order in 1981 in an at-
tempt to provide a clear presidential statement about the duties and
responsibilities of the agencies involved in the national intelligence ef-
fort and to mandate the adoption of internal administrative minimiza-
tion procedures applicable to all surveillance efforts conducted by
members of the U.S. Intelligence Community)° 7 Similar executive or-
ders issued by Presidents Ford and Carter during their administrations
preceded Executive Order No. 12,333.108
 Unlike its predecessors, how-
ever, Executive Order No. 12,333 has remained in force and virtually
unchanged since its issuance in .1981) 09 It has represented the princi-
pal executive-branch statement regarding the appropriate scope of U.S.
intelligence agency operations for the last twenty-five years)'°
In addition to containing broad pronouncements about the goals
and duties of the different components of the U.S. intelligence appara-
tus, Executive Order No. 12,333 also places specific limitations on the
proper means of conducting intelligence collection. For example, it
authorizes the NSA, as a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
to collect and disseminate inforination about U.S. citizens for foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence purposes, but it limits such collec-
tion efforts to those conducted in accordance with the procedures set
forth by the Director of the NSA and the Attorney General)" Further,
it gives the Attorney General the'power to approve the use of electronic
surveillance upon his or her own determination that there is probable
cause to believe that the surveillance is to be used against a foreign
of Directive No. 5240.1. See DoD Reg. No. 5240.1-R, supra note 4. These regulations and
directives arc revised and reissued periodically using the same numbering. The NSA is
required to adhere to both Directive No. 5240.1 and Regulation No. 5240.1-R. The agency
issued USS1D 18 as an agency-level implementation guideline that lists the minimization
procedures mandated by both Directive No. 5240.1 and Executive Order No. 12,333. See
USSID 18, supra note 13.
106
 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note
(2000).
107
"8 See Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976) (issued by President. Ford); Exec.
Order No. 12,036, 3 GER. 112 (1978) (issued by President Carter).
1 " See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note
(2000),
110 See id., reprinted in 50 U.S.G. § 401 note (2000).
111 Id. § 2.3, 3 C.F.R. at 211, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (2000).
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power or agent." 2
 The order also requires, however, the Attorney Gen-
eral to comply with the minimization requirements imposed by RSA.'"
With respect to ECHELON, the restrictions imposed by Executive
Order No. 12,333 and FISA apply only to situations where the NSA
seeks to conduct surveillance within the United States or against U.S.
persons abroad.'" Virtually no restrictions are placed on the ability of
the agency to conduct such surveillance on non-U.S. persons located
outside the territorial limits of the United States." 5 Because the NSA
is allowed to conduct virtually unfettered surveillance of foreign per-
sons outside the United States, American citizens may be inadver-
tently surveilled by the NSA without a warrant whenever they com-
municate with foreign persons located in other countries. 116 Even
assuming that the NSA does not routinely engage in the interception
of domestic U.S. signals, the capture of so many foreign communica-
tions still results in the collection, without a warrant, of a significant
number of phone calls made to and from U.S. persons each year." 7
Presumably, such situations occurred even prior to President Bush's
issuance of the secret executive order allowing warrantless domestic
surveillance in apparent violation of FISA." 8
112 Id
. § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. at 212, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (2000).
113 See id., reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (2000).
114 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2000 & Supp. III 2003); Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.4, 3
C.F.R. at 212 , reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (2000) ("Agencies within the Intelligence
Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United
States or directed at United States persons abroad.") (emphasis added). Neither FISA nor Execu-
tive Order No. 12,333 place restrictions on the NSA's ability to conduct surveillance target-
ing non-U.S. persons outside the United States provided the surveillance does not impinge
upon the rights of any U.S. person. See EISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1); Exec. Order No. 12,333,
§ 2.4, 3 C.F.R. at 212, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (2000).
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 EISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1); Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.4, 3 C.F.R. 200, 212 (1982),
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (2000); see also Verdago-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75 (rea-
soning that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a Mexican citizen when the place
searched was in Mexico).
116 Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States provides an illustration of this
point. See 277 U.S. at 471-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). He explained that
The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater
than that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is
tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all
conversations between them upon any subject, and although proper,
confidential, and privileged, may he overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one
man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other
person whom he may call, or who may call him.
Id. at 475-76.
117 See Loeb, supra note 42, at A3.
118
 See id.
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Although the likelihood for the warrantless seizure of interna-
tional communications involving U.S. citizens seems quite high, the
agency has adopted internal safeguards to limit the adverse effects of
ECHELON'S massive signals intelligence operations with respect to
the rights of U.S. citizens. These internal safeguards, mandated by
both Executive Order No. 12,333 119 and Department of Defense Di-
rective 5240.1, 120 are embodied in USSID
D. United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18)
USSID 18 sets forth the primary operating guidelines that govern
the signals intelligence operati6ns of the NSA. 122 FISA and Executive
Order No. 12,333 require these "minimization procedures" in order to
reduce the "acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination,
of nonpublic information concerning unconsenting United States per-
sons."125 Accordingly, the NSA's primary objective in detailing these
procedures is to minimize the impact on U.S. persons caused by the
otherwise legitimate warrantless electronic surveillance routinely con-
ducted by the NSA on non-U.S. persons abroad. 124 Fundamentally, US-
SID 18 is an attempt to strike a. balance between the often competing
interests of Fourth Amendment privacy guarantees and U.S. national
security. 125
It is the stated policy of the NSA "to target or collect only foreign
communications."126 USSID 18 makes clear that the NSA "will not in-
tentionally collect communications to, from or about U.S. persons or
persons or entities in the United States," except as allowed under its
provisions. 127 Although the NSA ;
 generally may not intentionally collect
the communications of U.S. persons without a FISA warrant, USSID 18
specifically states that the agency may collect such communications un-
intentionally. 128
 More specifically, section 3.1 of USSID 18 states that if
the NSA "inadvertently" collects communications made to or from U.S.
persons who were not the lawful target of the surveillance efforts, the
119 See generally Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note
(2000).
129 See generally DoD Directive No. 5240.1, supra note 105.
121 See generally USSID 18, supra note 13.
122 Id,
123
 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (1) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
124 See USSID 18, supra note 13, § 1.2.
120 See id.
126 Id. § 3. 1 .
127 Id.
128 See id.
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agency may still retain, analyze, and disseminate such information un-
der certain circumstances. 129
Most of these specific situations are unknown because they seem to
be enumerated in sections 4.4 to 4.7 of USSID 18, which have been re-
dacted from the declassified version of the directive."° Some indica-
tions may be gleaned, however, from other declassified provisions."'
For instance, USSID 18's definition of "foreign communication" pro-
vides some indication of the types of communications allowed to be
retained.'" Section 9.8 defines a foreign communication as "a commu-
nication that has at least one communicant outside the United States
."' 33 Although surveillance efforts directed at premises in the
United States are not considered foreign communications under the
definition, efforts aimed at foreign residences, which inadvertently re-
sult in the collection of calls to and from U.S. persons, clearly remain
part of the definition. 134 The fact that these communications are con-
sidered "foreign communications" is significant because it is the stated
policy of the NSA to "target or collect only foreign communications." 135
Because ECHELON and other NSA signals intelligence efforts are es-
timated to collect most foreign communications transmitted worldwide,
the "inadvertent" surveillance of U.S. persons placing international
telephone calls can be assumed to be quite frequent." 6
In order to mitigate the effects of this unavoidable consequence
of the NSA's foreign intelligence efforts, USSID 18 section 7.1 pro-
vides that "foreign intelligence information concerning U.S. persons
must be disseminated in a manner which does not identify the U.S.
person."'" This is typically accomplished by redacting the U.S. per-
son's name or by similar means."8 USSID 18 does, however, allow dis-
129 USSI D 18, supra note 13, § 3.1.
13° See id. §§ 4.4-4.7.
131 See id. § 9.8.
132 See id.
133 Id. The definition also includes communications that are "entirely among foreign
powers or between a foreign power and officials of a foreign power ...." Id.
im See USSID 18, .supra note 13, § 9.8.
135 See id. § 3.1.
136 See Sloan, supra note 35, at 1474. ("It is alleged that ECHELON intercepts all major
modes of signal transmission, including land-lines, high-frequency radio, microwave radio
relay, communications satellites, subsea cables, and the Internet."); see also Loeb, supra
note 42, at A3 (citing reports that estimate that the ECHELON system captures up to 3
billion communications each day).
137 USSID 18, supra note 13, § 7.1.
136 Id. ("Generic or general terms or phrases must be substituted for the identity (e.g.
'U.S. firm . for the specific name of a U.S. Corporation or 'U.S. Person' for the specific
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semination of the U.S. person's identity in a number of circum-
stances.'" For instance, section 7.2(c) allows a U.S. person's name to
be disseminated if the person's identity is "necessary to understand
the foreign intelligence information or assess its importance." 14° The
section also includes a non-exhaustive list of situations that would sat-
isfy this requirement."' For example, section 7.2(c) provides that in-
advertently acquired informatibn regarding a U.S. person may be dis-
seminated directly to domestic law enforcement agencies if the
information indicates that the U.S. person is somehow involved in
criminal activity. 142 This can occur despite the fact that no warrant was
issued to authorize the initial surveillance responsible for acquiring
the incriminating evidence from the unsuspecting and otherwise con-
stitutionally protected U.S. person. 143
The Fourth Amendment has yet to be extended to prevent such a
situation. The issue is difficult to resolve because those who have stand-
ing to challenge such surveillance are unaware that they were initially
targeted for criminal investigation based on information gained
through warrantless surveillance of their international phone calls by
the NSA.'" The current controversy involving the secret directive is-
sued by President Bush may bring these issues before the Supreme
Court in the near future. Should this occur, many key issues will be pre-
sented, and the next generation of Fourth Amendment rights may be
defined.
name of a U.S. Person). Files containing the identities or U.S. persons deleted from
SIGINT reports will be maintained for a maximum period of one year .. .").
139
 Id. § 7.2.
I" Id. § 7.2(c).
141 Id.
142 USSID 18, supra note 13, § 7.2(c) (4). Information about a U.S. person can be kept.
and disseminated if "ItJhe information is evidence that the individual may be involved in a
crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that the dissemination
is for law enforcement purposes." Id.
143 See id.
141 Although FISA requires the government to notiI} , criminal defendants when it seeks
to use, against the defendant, information obtained through electronic surveillance, this
requirement is limited to information obtained pursuant to a FISA warrant and also does
not apply unless the government seeks to introduce the evidence at trial. The statute does
not require the government to inform the defendant about information used only to initi-
ate a criminal investigation. If the government does not seek to introduce the FISA evi-
dence at trial, then it presumably may keep that evidence secret. Moreover, this require-
ment also only applies in situations where FISA is applicable. Thus, lawfully warrantless
non-FISA foreign surveillance is not subject to this limitation. See FISA, 50 U.S.C.
§1806(c)—(d) (2000 & 5upp. III 2003).
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Perhaps the controversy also will cause legal policymakers at the
NSA to reexamine the application of the current minimization pro-
cedures expressed in USSID 18. If so, one question that the Court
should consider, when determining whether to allow the dissemina-
tion of information without a warrant, is the degree to which those
procedures should take into account the reasonableness of one's ex-
pectation of privacy. Because the scope of the Fourth Amendment's
protection is based largely on the reasonableness of one's subjective
expectation of privacy, it seems to follow that individuals should be
able to take affirmative technological steps such as the use of en-
crypted Internet telephony that would provide them with heightened
constitutional protection against Unwarranted invasion.
III. ENCRYPTED VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL, CRYPTANALYSIS,
AND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Encrypted VolP
As technology advances, the ability of individuals to protect their
privacy against undesired intrusion is growing. In recent years, an in-
creasing number of people are using Internet telephony' 45—also
known as Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP")—instead of traditional
telephone services for their international telecommunications." 6 VolP
converts analog voice communications into a compressed digital data
format that is then transferred from computer to computer over regu-
lar Internet protocol data networks."7 This enables computer users to
speak to one another via the Internet using their existing Internet con-
nections, often at no additional cost.'" Because the data is converted
into a digital form prior to transmission, efforts are increasing to bring
about widespread use of data encryption methods to protect these
145
 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., EPIC Internet Telephony Page, http://www.epic.org/
privacy/voip (last visited Man 28, 2006) (defining and explaining Internet telephony).
146
 VoIP usage is on the rise, and major corporations are beginning to invest large
sums in its development. In September 2005, ebay, Inc. purchased Skype Technologies,
S.A. for $2.6 billion. Skype Technologies is currently the world leader in Internet teleph-
ony, with 54 million customers and projected revenue of more than $200 million in 2006.
Although criticized by some as a risky investment by eliay, the move certainly demonstrates
a strong expectation that use of Internet telephony will continue to grow significantly in
coming years. See Jonathan Krim, EBay's Skype Risk Is a Calculated One, WASH. POST, Sept.
22, 2005, at Dl.
147 See Elec. Privacy Info. Cir., supra note 145.
148 see id.
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communications from eavesdropping en route. 149 For instance, Skype
Technologies, one of the world's leading VoIP providers, utilizes a 256-
bit Advanced Encryption Standard ("AES") encryption algorithm that
many experts believe to be functionally unbreakable.'" Difficulties are
posed, however, when users of one service attempt to communicate
with users of another. 151
Today, VoIP encryption is still in its infancy, with widespread in-
ter-service usage being hindered by the difficulty in standardization of
VoIP protocols and the unwillingness of some providers to offer open
architectures that would allow different encryption algorithms to ne-
gotiate between communication endpoints. 152 These barriers are
slowly being eroded by the efforts of privacy advocates and philan-
thropic cryptographic experts who are working to adapt popular
open-source cryptosystems for widespread distribution and usage. 153
Thus, despite initial compatibility difficulties, the use of encrypted
149 See Andreas M. Antonopoulos & Joseph D. Knape, Security in Converged Networks,
INTERNET TELEPIIONY, Aug. 2002, available at http://www.tmcnet.com/it/0802/0802grlitm.
150 See David S. Bennahum, Can They Hear You Now?, SLATE, Feb. 19, 2004,
http://www.slate.com/id/2095777/ (quoting the National Institute of Science arid Tech-
nology as stating that "it would take a computer using present-day technology 'approxi-
mately 149 thousand-billion (149 trillion) years to crack a 128-bit AES key"). Skype's 256-
bit standard offers an even greater level of security. Id.
151 Skype uses a proprietary protocol that is not compatible with many other sumdards,
such as Session Initiation Protocol ("SIP") and Inter-Asterisk eXchange Protocol ("1AX");
therefore, users of other providers are often unable to communicate with users on the
Skype network. See Brian Livingston, Beware Skype's Hype; Focus on SIP-Compliant Internet
Calling Instead, EWEEK, Dec. I, 2003, at 64 ("Skype isn't compatible with SIP. You could
wake up one day to a nightmare in which some of your offices have adopted SIP while
others have downloaded Skype. Users couldn't rely on the incompatible services to call
one another."); see also Skype's the Limit, INFO. AGE, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.information-
age.com/article/2005/september/skypes_the  _limit (discussing the prospect of adding
VolP service to Google Talk and stating that "Google favours using IP telephony technol-
ogy from start up SlPphone, which is compatible with the Vonage service but not Skype.").
152 See Antonopoulos & Knape, supra note 149; Livingston, supra note 151, at 64; Skype's
the Limit, supra note 151.
153 Most recently, the famous cryptographer Phillip Zimmermann announced a new en-
crypted VolP program known as Zfone. In 1991, Zimmermann gained international acclaim
from privacy advocates when he developed Pretty Good Privacy ("PGP"), an encryption pro-
gram used to encrypt e-mail transmissions as well as stored data. Zimmermann distributed
the software for free, even publishing the source code on the Internet, in order to allow peer
scrutiny of the program. PGP was rumored to be unbreakable, even by the NSA, and Zim-
merman subsequently became the target of an extensive three-year federal criminal investiga-
tion for alleged violations of U.S. export restrictions on dual-use cryptographic technology.
See Ronald Bailey, Code Blues, REASON, May 1994, at 36; see also John E. Dunn, Encryption Guru
Returns with VolP Software, PC:Wont), July 27, 2005, http://www.pcworld.com/news/arti-
cle/0,aid,122000,00.asp; Phil Zimnrermann's Home Page, Background, hup://www.phil
zimmermann.com/EN/background/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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VoIP is beginning to spread and will soon become the standard for all
voice-over-Internet communications.
Although VoIP communications originally could be freely cap-
tured and overheard by anyone possessing the requisite technical
knowledge,I 54 today's encrypted VoIP conversations are practically in-
decipherable, even by the most sophisticated prolessionals. 155 The NSA
and CSS together form the world's premier cryptographic agency, em-
ploying the most advanced cryptanalytic capabilities in existence. 156
Through various means, the agency is able to decipher a significant
percentage of the encrypted communications it captures each day via
ECHELON and other means. 157 However, the decryption process in-
volves additional steps that raise constitutional concerns. 158
The decryption of encrypted VolP communications requires the
agency to take numerous additional steps in order to understand the
information they have acquired. 159 Although ECHELON may cast a
wide net, capturing most electronic communications transmitted
worldwide, the NSA/CSS must employ extraordinary measures before
any encrypted VoIP communication can be understood and ana-
lyzed. 16° This raises questions about the reasonable expectations of U.S.
citizens employing these technologies and the extent to which the Con-
stitution, through the application of the Fourth Amendment, should
permit the government to use information gained through the frustra-
tion of those expectations.
154 See Niall Magennis, Shills Development, NEMORK Naws, Mar. 31, 1999 (available on
LexisNexis) ("Security is critical to the future of VoIP because it is remarkably easy to listen
in on current VolP conversations using a protocol analyzer.").
155 See Bennall1L111, supra note 150.
156 Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., supra note 24.
157 See Matthew Schwartz, Intercepting Messages, ComPuTERIATouto, Aug. 28, 2000, at 48
(alleging that "Echelon is able to intercept and decrypt almost any electronic message sent
anywhere in the world"). But see Sloan, supra note 35, at 1482-83 (discussing the limita-
tions on the NSA's ability to decrypt communications encrypted using modern encryption
programs).
158 In Part IV or this Article, I argue that the government's use of the extraordinary
measures necessary to crack encrypted VoIP violates the reasonable expectation of privacy
held by protected persons under the Fourth Amendment. See infra notes 192-232 and
accompanying text.
155 See Max Schiresmi, Deioding the Complexities of Cryptography, PC Wx., Jan. 10, 1994, at
84 (discussing several methods of cryptanalysis).
16° The term 'extraordinary means" is used here to refer to the use of electronic or
other resources which perform high-speed processing that exceeds the capabilities of hu-
man beings.
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B. Cradling Encrypted VolP Through Crypianalysis
In order to provide a background for the cryptanalysis debate, it is
helpful to define some of the basic terminology in the field. There is a
distinct difference between decryption through cryptanalysis and
through non-cryptanalytic means. The term "cryptanalysis" refers to
methods through which encrypted messages are decrypted without
having access to the password or passphrase that allows those messages
to be deciphered. 161 In other words, this involves cracking the encryp-
tion itself. 162 In comparison, non-cryptanalytic methods involve learn-
ing or "stealing" the relevant passwords or passphrases. 163
Cryptographers use many techniques to break codes directly. Al-
though a detailed discussion of such cryptanalytic techniques is be-
yond the scope of this Article, it is useful to discuss briefly several
cryptanalytic techniques in order to distinguish them from the more
invasive non-cryptanalytic methods discussed in Part III.C. One form
of cryptanalysis involves attacking the encryption algorithm directly.
Because computer algorithms arc used to encrypt data, structural
weaknesses in those algorithms may be exploited to decipher mes-
sages encrypted using that methodim Many of the most popular en-
cryption algorithms utilized today are open-source and have been
tested extensively for the types of structural weaknesses that plagued
some earlier encryption standards. 165 Although the structural integrity
161 BBC.co.uk, Basic Gryptanalysis, littp://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/alabaster/A613135
(last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
162 See id.
165 See id.
164 An algorithm is a set of instructions which is performed to accomplish a certain
task. In the case of encryption software, the encryption algorithm performs a set of recur-
ring operations to scramble data into an unintelligible form. Because of the recurring
nature of these operations, a weakness in the design of the algorithm can produce patterns
which can he exploited to decrypt data which has been encrypted using that method. See
Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mandril, & Adi Shamir, Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithnt of
RC4 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.drizzle.com/—aboba/lEEE/rc4_
ksaproc.pdf (last visited Man 30, 2006) (exposing a major flaw in Wired Equivalent Privacy
("WEP") that stemmed from the fact that its key scheduling algorithm caused the same
keys to be repeated often and at predictable intervals); see alio Rik Farrow, Wireless Security:
Send in the Clowns?, NETw ouic MAc., Sept. 1, 2003, at 54 (discussing WEP's vulnerability);
Bob Walden Networks Focus; Cryptography, Cost NITER WKLY., Nov. 25, 2003, at 50 (providing
an explanation of public and private key encryption systems).
165 Open-source programs are assumed to he well-tested because anyone in the world is
free to examine them; however, some experts caution that open-source availability does
not necessarily guarantee security. See Gary McGraw & John Viega, Practice Safe Software
Coding, INFO. SECURITY, Sept. 2001, at 62 ("One common fallacy is to believe that open-
source software is likely to be secure, because its availability will lead to people performing
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of such algorithms is sound, their open-source nature means that
there is no secret as to their operation.' 66 Therefore, the only thing
standing in the way of sophisticated decryption efforts is the strength
of the key that controls the operation of the cipher. 167
Cryptographers use many methods to decipher encryption keys.
For example, encrypted texts may be subjected to a number of tech-
niques, such as "brute force" attack, 168 differential cryptanalysis,' 69 or
known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks.' 7° All are means of de-
ciphering messages without having access to the passphrase used to
decode them. In theory, virtually all ciphers can be broken by "brute
force" or other cryptanalytic means.' 7 ' However, given the myriad of
possible keys and passphrases that could be used, these methods often
prove to be too time consuming for practical application. 172 For ex-
ample, the National Institute of Science and Technology estimates
that it would take a standard computer approximately 149 trillion
years to break even a 128-bit AES key, which is currently half the
length of the AES keys used to encrypt Skype's VoIP transmissions.'"
Even assuming the vastly superior computational abilities of the
NSA, standard decryption via conventional cryptanalytic means would
be very inefficient. 174 Although the specific methods of the NSA arc not
security audits.... There [is] strong evidence to suggest that source code availability does
[not] provide strong incentive for people to review the code design.").
136
 Kerckhoffs' Law stands for the proposition that, regardless of the sophistication of
the data encryption algorithm, one should never rely on the secrecy of the algorithm
alone to maintain the security of encrypted data. Because of the nature of algorithms, it is
reasonable to assume that the details of the algorithm's operation are known to whomever
is attempting to decrypt encrypted ciphertext. Security is provided not by the secrecy and
complexity of the algorithm, but rather by the secrecy and complexity of the key. See
BBC.co.uk, supra note 161.
167 See id.
163 The simplest form of cryptanalysis is known as a "brute force attack." This method
involves bombarding an encrypted message with every possible key or passphrase in an
attempt to decipher the code. Data Encryption Essentials; Seware Security, SOFTWARE WORLD,
Sept. 1, 2005, at 15.
169 See Max Schireson, Decoding the Complexities of Cryptography, PC WK., Jan. 10, 1994, at
84 (providing a description of differential cryptanalysis).
17° See George T. Friedlob et al., An Auditor's Primer on Encryption, CPA J., Nov. I, 1997,
at 40 (describing known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks). See generally Howard M.
Heys, A Thiorial on Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis, 26 CRYPTOLOGIA 189 (2002).
171 See Peter Coffee, No Crypt° Is Tho 'Rough to Crack, PC WK., Sept. 29, 1997, at 16.
172 See Bennahum, supra note 150 (discussing the incredible amount of time necessary
to perform a successful brute force attack on a message encrypted using 128-bit AES en-
cryption).
173
 See id.
174 See id.
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publicly known, it can be assumed that the agency uses such methods
only as a last resort. Direct cryptanalysis is unnecessary if the NSA is
able to determine a person's passphrase. This could be achieved though
a variety of means. In addition to the more forceful "rubber-hose"
methods,"8 there are a number of non-cryptanalytic techniques that
the NSA could employ to learn a suspect's passphrase.
C. Non-Cryptanalytic Means of Cracking Encrypted VoIP
Given the difficulty of applying direct cryptanalytic methods to
defeat the use of modern encryption programs, the U.S. government
has developed other means of deciphering these conversations.'" Such
non-cryptanalytic methods include social engineering,'" signals intelli-
gence (electronic surveillance), ph ish ng,"8 site spoofing (pharm-
ing), 178 and keystroke logging. 180 In late 2001, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (the "FBI") was reported to have developed its own key-
175 The term "rubber-hose cryptanalysis" refers to the use of torture or other coercive
means to obtain keys and passphrases from those in possession of them. See Tech FAQ
What Is Rubber Hose Cryptology?, http://www.tech-faq.com/rubber-hose-cryptology.shtml
(last visited Apr. 7, 2006); see also Danny O'Brien, Yahoo Has Power to End Chinese Net Censor-
ship, hum' Taus, Sept. 30, 2005, at 7 (discussing the use of rubber-hose cryptanalysis in
China).
176 See Elizabeth Clark, Illuminating Magic Lantern, Nrrwomc MAG., Feb. 1, 2002, at 18
(discussing the FBI's keystroke-logging Trojan Horse virus known as "Magic lantern").
177 Social engineering is a broad term that encompasses many other forms of non-
cryptanalytic tactics such as phishing and pharming. Social engineering involves exploiting
the naivete of unsophisticated computer users to gain knowledge of passphrases and other
personal data. See Security Dictionary, !NFU, AGE, May 11, 2005, available at http://www.in-
formation-age.com/article/2005/may/security dictionary.
178 Phishing is a tactic often used by hackers whereby an e-mail is sent to various users
claiming to be From a well-known financial organization. Such e-mails often claim that a
problem has arisen that requires the recipient to log in to a website purportedly adminis-
tered by the financial organization. When the person logs into the fake site, he or she ends
up providing his or her password and login details to criminals who then use the informa-
tion to gain access to the user's actual account. See Chris Green, Data Business; Tis the Sea-
son to Beware Phishing Scams, COM P UT ING, Dec. 15, 2005, at 38.
178 Site spoofing, also known as "pharming," is often performed in conjunction with
phishing-. Site spooling involves manipulation of the Domain Name System to direct Inter-
net traffic to imposter websites. These imposter sites appear to be the exact same as the
legitimate company being spoofed. When customers attempt to log in to these sites their
user IDs, passwords, credit card numbers, or other personal data is sent directly to the
criminals running the site. See Catherine Sanders Reach, Pharming & Other New Hacker
Scams, L. TECH. NEWS, May 2005, at 46 (offering an explanation of "[larming").
180 See Susanna Schrobsdorlf, Cyber-Insecurity, NmswcEit. (web exclusive), June 21,
2005, http://www.msnbc.nisn.com/id/8306655/site/newsweek.
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stroke-logging virus.'m The program, known as "Magic Lantern," works
like the standard keystroke-logging Trojan horse viruses traditionally
used by hackers. 182 The FBI surreptitiously uploads its keystroke-logging
software onto the computers of those it seeks to surveil. 183 Once in-
stalled, this program allows the FBI to record every keystroke that users
type into the infected computer. 184 When the suspect types in his or her
passphrase, this information is captured and then may be used to deci-
pher every communication or file that is encrypted using the same
phrase.' 85
Although the FBI must obtain a warrant in order to install such
programs on computers within the United States, the NSA is not re-
quired to obtain a warrant before installing similar programs on the
computers of non-U.S. persons abroad.' 86 As a result, U.S. persons
contacting foreign persons abroad via e-mail or Internet telephony
may have those communications compromised despite the use of en-
cryption.
D. U.S. Legal Restraints on the Use of Cryptanalytic and Non-Cryptanalytic
'Tactics on Non-U.S. Persons Outside the United Slates
Under U.S. law, there arc virtually no legal restraints on the abil-
ity of the NSA to use cryptanalytic or non-cryptanalytic tactics against
non-U.S. persons outside the United States. 187 It has long been recog-
nized that the U.S. Constitution does not extend its protections out-
side U.S. borders, except with respect to U.S. persons.' 88 For example,
in 1990, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court held
that the Fourth Amendment does not place any limits on the ability of
U.S. government agents to perform even physical searches of the
homes of aliens outside the United States.' 89 A natural extension of
this decision is that no warrant is required for even the most intrusive
181 Dan Verton, Feds Boost Online Surveillance Activity, CNN.coM, Dec. 11, 2001, littp://ar-
chives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/12/11/online.surveillance.idg/index.html.
182 Christopher Woo & Mirada So, The Case for Magic Lantern: September 11 Highlights the
Need for Increased Surveillance, 15 HAW:. J.L. & TEmt. 521, 524 (2002).
im See id.
184 Neal Hartzog, Comment, The Magic Lantern" Revealed: A Report of the FBI's New "Key
Logging" Trojan and Analysis of Its Possible Treatment in a Dynamic Legal Landscape, 201 MAR-
SHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 287, 288 (2002).
185 See id.
186 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990).
187 See supra notes 51-194 and accompanying text.
188 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
189 494 U.S. at 274-75.
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electronic invasions of foreign computers by government agents. 190 In
light of the length of time it takes to perform actual cryptanalysis to
break ciphers and the lack of legal restrictions in this area, it can be
assumed that the NSA widely employs methods similar to Magic Lan-
tern and has installed Trojan horse software on many computers of
interest throughout the world.
Given the NSA's exceptional cryptanalytic resources and the ab-
sence of domestic legal restraints on the agency's use of non-
cryptanalytic methods on aliens outside the United States, even the
most private international VoEP calls of U.S. citizens probably may be
overheard, despite the use of reasonable steps to maintain privacy. Even
American citizens who have taken every reasonable precaution to avoid
eavesdropping—by using encrypted VoIP technology—may have their
conversations decrypted and overheard by the NSA as a result of the
use of invasive non-cryptanalytic techniques against the NSA's foreign
contact. This is although the use of such techniques clearly would be
illegal if conducted directly against the U.S. person without a war-
rant. 191 Situations such as this violate the reasonable expectations of
American citizens who use encrypted VoIP technology. When informa-
tion acquired through these means is then used by the government to
initiate a criminal investigation against a U.S. person, a court should
find that the Fourth Amendment has been violated.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL OVERBREADT11 of USSID 18 § 7.2(c) (4)
AS APPLIED TO 'HIE ENCRYPTED VOIP CONVERSATIONS
OF U.S. PERSONS
A. The Fourth Amendment and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment places its protections largely in the
hands of individuals. It guarantees that protected persons will not be
subjected to warrantless governMent invasions of their private lives if
they take reasonable measures to ensure their privacy. 192 The warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment extends to situations where
an objectively reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy ex-
19° See id.
191 The Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant before using
invasive methods of cryptanalysis in most cases. See United States v. Scarlb, 180 F. Supp. 2d
572,577-78 (1).N1,1.2001) (explaining that the FBI needed a warrant to install a keystroke-
logging program on a suspects computer).
194 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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ists. 193
 Although one is not entitled to claim privilege over matters left
open to the world, people may expect that private conversations will
remain free from unwarranted government surveillance if reasonable
measures have been taken to keep those conversations from being
'overheard. 194
 If such measures have been taken, then a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists, and those conversations may not be sur-
veilled absent probable cause and a warrant demonstrating that proof
has been made to that effect.' 96
The Supreme Court has established a two-part analysis that is used
to determine whether a particular area is entitled to Fourth Amend-
ment protection.' 96 First, the person must have "manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy" in that area. 197 It would be difficult to argue that
this prong is not satisfied in the case of either encrypted or unen-
crypted VoIP because it can be assumed that most people hold a sub-
jective expectation that their private telephonic conversations will not
be overheard by unknown third parties. This subjective expectation is
manifested even more clearly when users choose to protect their con-
versations through encryption.
Second, the expectation of privacy must be one that "society is
willing to recognize as legitimate." 198 The Supreme Court has gener-
ally adopted a rights-based approach to handling this second crite-
rion, finding that one must have a right of privacy in the disputed
area enforceable outside of the Fourth Amendment to claim a legally
justifiable expectation of privacy. 199 Society has long recognized the
195 See CalifOrnia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1985).
194 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (holding that even a telephone conversation taking place
in a public telephone booth is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, provided that
the individual closes the door).
195 See id. at 357 ( — Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,' and that searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment ....") (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 51 (1951)) (footnote omitted).
198 Id, at 361 (Harland., concurring); see alto Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338
(2000) ("Our Fourth Amendment analysis embraces two questions. First, we ask whether
the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that is,
whether he has shown that. he 'sought] to preserve [something] as private....' Second,
we inquire whether the individual's expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.'") (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979))
(footnote omitted).
197 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
198 Id.; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harland., concurring).
199 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a "Reason-
able Expectation of Privacy"?, 33 CoNN. L. Ray. 503, 508 (2001).
20061	 Decrypting the Fourth Amendment 	 537
legitimacy of one's expectation of privacy during telecommunications.
For example, both FISA and the ECPA make it a felony to engage in
nonconsensual telephonic eavesdropping without a warrant.m VoIP is
essentially a telephone call that is made using alternative means. Ac-
cordingly, it is illogical to argue . that society would be willing to accept
phone conversations as legitimately private when conducted via tradi-
tional phone networks but somehow illegitimate and unprotected
when conducted via secure Internet telephony, 201 Thus, both prongs
of the test are satisfied. Accordingly, VoIP conversations should be
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and the government should be
required to obtain a warrant prior to undertaking targeted surveil-
lance of such conversations. 202
200 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000); see also ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000 & Supp. Ill
2003).
201 Initially, courts had been unwilling to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy
in calls made using cordless telephones due to the ease with which they could be inadver-
te ► tly monitored. See McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1239-40 (6th Cir. 1995). In 1994,
Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, which ex-
tended the wiretapping prohibitions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, making them applicable to eavesdropping on cordless telephones as
well as land-based phones. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-414, § 202, 108 Stat. 4279, 4290-91 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511
(2000 & Supp. III 2003)). Even before Congress extended Title III's protections, the situa-
tion posed by portable phones was entirely distinguishable from the case of both tradi-
tional and encrypted Volt'. Although neighbors using similar phones could inadvertently
overhear cordless telephone calls, eavesdropping on traditional VoIP conversations
quires intentional efforts by someone with an uncommon level of computer knowledge
and skill. In the case of encrypted VoIP, not only are such conversations immune from
casual or inadvertent eavesdropping, but intentional surveillance also is rendered ineffec-
tive by the level of encryption employed. Only the most sophisticated technicians with
access to state-of-the-art equipment and extraordinary computational resources would be
able to decrypt such communications. Thus, due to the almost unparalleled security of
Vo1P communications, the Fourth Amendment certainly should extend to protect users'
expectations that their encrypted VoIP conversations will not be surveilled by the gove•n-
ment without a warrant.
"2 Although courts generally have refused to recognize a general right to privacy for
web surfing and other public activities on the Internet, the issue of whether the govern-
ment may seize private person-to-person Internet communications en route is a different
matter entirely. See Mitchell Waldman, Annotation, Expectation of Privacy in Internet Commu-
nications, 92 A.L.R. 5an 15, § 5 (2001). Courts have already recognized a person's reason-
able expectation that private e-mails and phone conversations will not be intercepted by
the government en route without a warrant. E.g., United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326, 330
(C.A.A.F. 2000) ("fhe transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation
that police officials will not intercept the transmission without probable cause and a search
warrant.") (citing United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996)); United
States v. Long, 61 M.J. 539, 546 (N-M. Ct.Crim. App. 2005) ("11A/Jhile the e-mails may have
been monitored for purposes of maintaining and protecting the system from malfunction
or abuse, they were subject to seizure by law enforcement personnel only by disclosure as a
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Although it is clear that U.S. persons are protected from warrant-
less government surveillance targeting their VoIP conversations, U.S.
persons are not currently protected from situations where such con-
versations are surveilled indirectly by the government during the oth-
erwise lawful warrantless surveillance of non-U.S. persons abroad.
When such a situation occurs, and information to and from U.S. per-
sons is collected without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment should
still apply, and the reasonable expectations of protected persons
should be respected.
B. Are Some Expectations More Reasonable than Others?
Arguably, a U.S. citizen's expectation of privacy in international
communications has never been more reasonable. According to esti-
mates, it would take a computer trillions of years to decipher a mes-
sage encrypted using an encryption standard that employs a key
length half of that currently used by Skype. 203 Consequently, en-
crypted VoIP users can be certain not only that their communications
are virtually immune from random eavesdropping, but that even the
NSA would find it difficult—perhaps even impossible—to surveil
those conversations purposefully, even with the extraordinary compu-
tational resources at their disposa1. 204
 Because encrypted VoIP is so
secure, it stands to reason that one's expectation of privacy in such
communications is much higher than it is with almost any other form
of communication. Because Fourth Amendment protection is based
largely on the reasonableness of one's expectations, it would seem
that using encrypted VoIP should provide U.S. citizens with the high-
est level of Fourth Amendment protection. 205
Some scholars disagree with this assessment, contending instead
that the use of encryption can never provide a reasonable expectation
result of monitoring or when a search was conducted in accordance with the principles
enunciated in the 4th Amendment."). Moreover, this recognition has Collie despite the
susceptibility of e-mails to eavesdropping by hackers. See Ed Oswald, Gmail Bug Exposes E-
mails to Hackers, BETANEWS, Jan. 12, 2005, http://www.betanews.com/article/Gmail_Bug_
Exposes_Emailstoliackers/1105561408. Although direct application of these principles
to Internet telephony remains scarce, presumably—given its similarity to e-mail messages
as discussed in United States a. Monroe—traditional Vol') will be afforded equivalent consti-
tutional protection in the future. See id; see also Monroe, 52 M.J. at 330.
SOS See Bennahurn, supra note 150.
204 See id.
205 See Sean J. Edgett, Comment, Double-Clicking on Fourth Amendment Protection: Encryp-
tion Creates a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 339, 365 (2003) (arguing that
the use of encryption creates a reasonable expectation of privacy).
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of privacy. 206 In a 2001 article, Professor Orin Kerr argues that encryp-
tion can never offer a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth
Amendment purposes because the Fourth Amendment limits only the
acquisition of materials, not the process used to analyze the materials
already in the government's possession.207 This argument presupposes
that information in the hands of the government has always come
into its possession pursuant to some sort of warrant, plain view, or
other constitutionally permissible means. It fails to consider the situa-
tion posed by the lawful warrantless surveillance conducted daily by
U.S. intelligence agencies on foreign persons abroad. Lawful interna-
tional signals intelligence operations result in an enormous amount
of data coining into the possession of the government without a war-
rant each day.2°8 Under Professor Kerr's analysis, which finds that en-
cryption itself offers no reasonable expectation of privacy, the gov-
ernment would be free to do what it pleases with the data collected
even if it was obtained through warrantless surveillance of U.S. cid-
zens.209 Once the data was lawfully in the possession of the govern-
ment, the Fourth Amendment's protections could never be triggered.
This argument is untenable in light of the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The issue of whether an item is
constitutionally protected is determined based solely on whether the
person claiming protection had manifested a subjective expectation
of privacy in that item, and whether that expectation is one which so-
ciety is willing to recognize as reasonable. 21 ° It is the reasonableness of
one's expectations that controls, not the location of the challenged
eviclence.2 " The fact that a piece of evidence is already in the hands
of the government is irrelevant to the constitutional analysis and sim-
ply begs the question.
Professor Kerr's analysis uses a plain-view rationale to explain why
review of items already in the possession of the government should
206 See Kerr, supra note 199, at 532.
207 See id. at 505 ("LEI ncryption cannot create Fourth Amendment protection because
the Fourth Amendment regulates government access to communications, not the cognitive
understanding of communications already obtained.").
205 See Loeb, supra note 42, at A3.
200 Professor Kerr's argument sets up an artificial all-or-nothing scenario. Under his
view, either all encryption creates a reasonable expectation of privacy, or no encryption
creates such an expectation. See Kerr, supra note 199, at 524 ("up- encryption can 'lock' a
communication and create a reasonable expectation of privacy, then every kind of encryp-
tion, ranging from Pig Latin ... to the strongest public key encryption, must. trigger the
same Fourth Amendment protection.").
210 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Oil See id, at 352 (majority opinion).
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not be subject to any further Fourth Amendment limitations. 212
 This
argument, however, ignores the fact that just because an item may be
readily seen by the government does not necessarily mean that the
item is in plain view.21 s The simple fact that a piece of encrypted ci-
phertext may be seen by police does not mean that its contents are
readily visible. In order to truly see the underlying message, govern-
ment agents must employ tactics and resources beyond mere human
analysis in order to bring the decrypted message's contents into view.
When encrypted data has come into the possession of the govern-
ment without a warrant, and in violation of the reasonable expecta-
tions of a protected person, the decryption of that data should re-
quire a warrant.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area makes it clear that
the "plain view" doctrine requires materials seized in warrantless
searches to have been readily visible to the naked eye without the use of
extraordinary or superhuman means. 214 In 2001, in Kyllo v. United Slaw
212 See generally Kerr, supra note 199. To support his claim that the Fourth Amendment
does not limit the efforts of law eninrcement once materials are already in their posses-
sion, Professor Kerr offers an oversimplification of the decryption process likening it to
taping together torn papers, solving riddles, understanding Pig Latin, or reading a doc-
tor's messy handwriting. See id. at 520, 521, 524. To be sure, the examples offered by Pro-
fessor Kerr would not he entitled to protection; however, this is not because the "en-
crypted" items are in the hands of the government, but rather because they may be
interpreted through human effort and arc therefore in plain view. Torn papers may he
taped together, foreign languages may be interpreted, and messy handwriting may be read-
ily understood without technological assistance. Cryptanalysis of computer-generated en-
cryption, however, requires the use of advanced computational resources that vastly sur-
pass human capacity.
212
 Professor Kerr compares encrypted ciphertext to a riddle and points out that, re-
gardless of the difficulty of a particular riddle, one could never expect a Fourth Amend-
ment expectation of privacy with respect to its meaning. Id. at 522-24. Again, this analogy
fails to recognize the difference between what can be seen or decrypted using human ef-
fOrt and what can be seen only by using extraordinary means beyond natural human ca-
pacity. See id. at 522.
2" See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 945, 450-51 (1989) (holding that a defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a greenhouse, the contents of which were
clearly visible from the sky). In Florida u Miley, where police peered inside the defendant's
greenhouse from a helicopter hovering 400 feet above the greenhouse, the Court dis-
cussed the altitude of the police helicopter at length, and the fact that the greenhouse's
contents were visible with the naked eye was crucial to the Court's finding that the area
was not protected by the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 450. Likewise, the police in Califor-
nia v. Ciraolo used a small plane to hover 1000 feet above the defendant's backyard; had
they needed special X-ray goggles or the use of a supercomputer to view the marijuana
plants growing in the backyard, presumably the Court would have found that such efforts
required a warrant. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 ("Mt is unreasonable for respondent to
expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being.observed with
the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.").
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the Court specifically rejected the argument that high technology
could be used to view the contents of protected areas not readily seen
by the naked eye. 215
 The Kyllo Court noted that a contrary approach
would leave the Fourth Amendment's protection "at the mercy of ad-
vancing technology."216 Specifically, the Court ruled in Kyllo that the
government may not use thermal imaging technology to learn about
the contents of a protected space without a warrant. 217 A natural exten-
sion of this holding is that the government is also prohibited from us-
ing technology to learn about the contents of a protected communica-
tion without a warrant. 218
This is not to say that the government may not use computers to
decrypt data that is already in its possession pursuant to a lawfully is-
sued warrant, The Fourth Amendment does not stand for the proposi-
tion that a person's reasonable expectation of privacy will never be vio-
lated by the government, only that a warrant is required to do so. 219
Such information may be decrypted not because it is already in the
possession of the government—as asserted by Professor Kerr—but
rather because it has come to be in its possession pursuant to a warrant
issued after a showing of probable cause. In instances where conversa-
tions have come into the possession of the government without a war-
rant, the reasonable expectations of the person surveilled must be re-
spected.
215 533 U.S. 27,39-35 (2001).
919
 Id. at 35. See generally Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth
Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325 (2002) (discuss-
ing the constitutional restraints on the government's ability to use technology to enhance
surveillance capabilities).
217 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
918 Professor Kerr offers a hypothetical involving a terrorist named Lex Luthor who
places an ad in a newspaper containing an obvious and easily broken code detailing a plot
to blow up a New York City subway station. See Kerr, supra note 199, at 519. If one simply
rips up a piece of paper or utilizes a simple encryption standard that can be broken
through basic human effort, such as the simple substitution cipher referenced in Professor
Kerr's Lex Luthor hypothetical, then not even the fiercest privacy advocate would argue
that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. See Kerr, supra note 199, at 519. To be sure,
no one could reasonably claim an expectation of privacy in a newspaper advertisement.
However, if' a U.S. citizen is communicating with a friend telephonically—an area long
recognized by society as legitimately private—and that person utilizes a military-grade en-
cryption standard, thus rendering their conversations indecipherable to all but the NSA,
then that person is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection because the expectation of
privacy is reasonable. The fact that the government is already in possession of the en-
crypted information is irrelevant to the inquiry.
219 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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To be sure, the government should not be required to determine a
person's protected status prior to all signals collection efforts. Such an
assessment would be impossible in the case of inadvertently acquired
information. A person's reasonable expectations should simply be re-
spected to the fullest extent practicable, and information collected
from a U.S. person without a warrant should never be used to initiate
general domestic criminal investigations against them unless truly exi-
gent circumstances are presented.
Professor Kerr states that "the Fourth Amendment is not a roving
privacy machine," but in many ways, it is. 2" The Supreme Court has
long held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 221
This protection travels with a person wherever he or she goes, and it
covers all situations where a legitimate expectation of privacy can be
held.222 The Supreme Court has made it clear that it is the reasonable-
ness of a person's expectation of privacy, not the geographic location of
the conversation in question, that determines whether or not a conver-
sation is protected. 2" American citizens do not lose their Fourth
Amendment rights simply because they set foot outside the United
States; likewise, their conversations do not become fair game once the
electrons transmitting them pass beyond U.S. borders.224
22° See Kerr, supra note 199, at 506.
221 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
222
 The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that an individual's Fourth
Amendment protection is limited to certain physical locations. Instead, according to the
Court, the protection travels with the individual, and even phone calls made from public
telephones may be protected if they are conducted in a manner that prevents them from
being casually overheard. See id. at 352.
223 See id.
224 Although the Supreme Court has never had occasion to hold that the Fourth
Amendment extends to protect American citizens from the acts of U.S. agents abroad, it
seems likely that the Court would do so if the issue were ever brought before it. See generally
United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1264 (5th Cir. 1979) (`The Fourth Amendment not
only protects all within our bounds; it also shelters our citizens wherever they may be in
the world from unreasonable searches by our own government."). Time Circuit Courts of
Appeals are almost unanimous on the issue, as demonstrated by their application of the
joint venture doctrine. The joint venture doctrine states that the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to searches conducted against U.S. persons abroad unless the searches are per-
formed by U.S. agents or by ibreign agents who are acting in close association with U.S.
agents. See United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that the ex-
clusionary rule may he invoked if U.S. agents are involved in an unlawful search con-
ducted by foreign officials overseas); see also United States v. i3ehety, 32 F.3d 503, 510 (11th
Cir. 1994) (stating that the Fourth Amendment may apply to a foreign search "if the for-
eign officials conducting the search were actually acting as agents for their American coun-
terparts"); United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that the
"exclusionary rule does apply to a foreign search if American officials or officers partici-
pated in some significant way"); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir.
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C. Redrafting USSID 18 § 7.2(c) (4) to Respect Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy
The reasonable expectation of privacy held by those using en-
crypted VoIP should afford them the highest level of protection avail-
able under the Fourth Amendment. Although such Fourth Amend-
ment protection should not prevent the government from analyzing
inadvertently acquired information, it should certainly prevent it from
using such information against protected persons except in cases of
emergency or situations where serious national security concerns are
involved.
Under most circumstances, USSID 18 minimizes the impact of
NSA surveillance on U.S. persOns, 225
 Under the directive, when in-
formation pertaining to a U.S. person is inadvertently acquired, either
it must be destroyed or the U.S. person's identity must be obscured or
redacted from all reports. 226 However, USSID 18 section 7.2(c) (4) al-
lows information obtained without a warrant to be kept and dissemi-
nated to law enforcement if it evinces any criminal conduct on the
part of the inadvertently surveilled U.S. person. 227 No consideration is
given to the reasonableness of the communicant's expectation of pri-
1968) (stating the Fourth Amendment could apply to raids by foreign officials only if
Federal agents so substantially participated in the raids so as to convert them into joint
ventures between the United States and the foreign officials"). In addition, the Supreme
Court has clearly extended other Bill of Rights protections to cover U.S. citizens abroad,
which makes it highly unlikely the Courtwould refuse to do so with respect to the Fourth
Amendment. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1957) (extending Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protection to American citizens abroad, and holding that "constitutional
protections for the individual were designed to restrict the United States Government
when it acts outside of this country, as well as here at home").
225 See generally USSID 18, supra note 13.
226
 Id. § 7.1 ("Except as provided in Section 7.2, foreign intelligence information con-
cerning U.S. persons must be disseminated in a manner which does not identify the U.S.
persons. Generic or general terms or phrases must be substituted for the identity ....");
see also NAT'L SEG. AGENCY / CENT. SEC. SERV., U.S. IDENTITIES IN SIGINT (1994), at app.
A, p. 2, available at http://www.gwu.edu/ .-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB24/nsal
 Id.pdf (de-
classified version with some language redacted by the NSA) ("Unless specific approval has
been granted to identify a U.S. [text redacted] or organization, reporters must use a ge-
neric identification. Reporters must also be careful not to use any information that allows a
reader to identify the person or organization by context."); id. at 28 ("End the inadvertent
intercept of communications solely betWeen U.S. persons upon recognition of that fact.
[text redacted] When such material is retained, do not retain any personally identifiable
information (other than equipment names and technical data) concerning U.S. per-
sons.").
227 USSID 18, supra note 13, § 7.2(c) (4).
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vacy, and no limitations are expressed regarding the types of offenses
that may be revealed.228
Under the provision as it is currently written, evidence that an
American citizen may have committed a misdemeanor could properly
be disseminated to police for local criminal investigation. 229
 There is
no differentiation or qualification regarding the seriousness of the
offense revealed. 230
 Without any limitation on the type of "criminal"
information that can be turned over to law enforcement, this provi-
sion represents a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of those
surveilled."' A reasonable limitation must be placed on this dissemi-
nation power, limiting it to situations where grave national security or
other emergency situations are presented. Most of the other excep-
tions listed under USSID 18 section 7.2(c) require some form of exi-
gent circumstance to exist before a U.S. citizen's identity may be di-
vulged.232
 Section 7.2(c)(4) likewise should contain such limits.
CONCLUSION
Although the NSA's surveillance capabilities have grown consid-
erably in recent years, so have the means through which citizens may
affirmatively protect their own privacy. New forms of encrypted Inter-
net telephony are offering Americans the ability to provide unparal-
leled security for their international telecommunications. Such meth-
ods were not generally available to the public when the current version
of USSID 18 was drafted in 1993. Even before the advent of encrypted
238
 See id.
229 See id.
230 See id.
23k See id.
252 See USSID 18, supra note 13, § 7.2(c). All but two of the exceptions listed under US-
MD 18 section 7.2(c) require the existence of circumstances which raise serious national
security or public safety concerns. Subsection 1 provides an exception if the information
indicates that the U.S. person may be an agent of a lbreign power. Id. § 7.2(c) (1 ). Subsec-
tion 2 allows disclosure if it appears the U.S. person may be "engaged in the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information." Id. § 7.2(c) (2). Subsection 3 allows disclosure if the
U.S. person is involved in international drug trafficking. Id. § 7.2(c) (3). Subsection 5 al-
lows disclosure if the information indicates that a 'U.S. person may be the target of hostile
intelligence activities of a foreign power." Id. § 7.2(c) (5). Subsection 6 allows disclosure if
the information is pertinent to a threat to the safety of an organization or person. Id.
§ 7.2(c) (6). The only two exceptions listed under USSID 18 section 7.2 that do not raise
potentially serious consequences for non-disclosure are: (1) subsection 7, which allows
disclosure of the identities of senior executive branch officials; and (2) subsection 4, which
allows disclosure of information that indicates any act of criminal behavior, with no limita-
tion on the type or seriousness of the criminal conduct that may trigger the exception. See
id. § 7.2(c) (4), (7).
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VoIP, courts had recognized that U.S. citizens held a reasonable expec-
tation that their e-mails and communications would not be captured en
route by the government without a warrant 233 Now that encryption
technology is becoming more widely available, U.S. citizens arc enjoy-
ing an extraordinary expectation of privacy, the reasonableness of
which is unprecedented in the field of communication.
The NSA is perhaps the most important force protecting the
United States from foreign terrorism and other threats to national
security. The information provided by the agency informs national
security and foreign policy decisioninakers, thereby also playing a vital
role in ensuring international peace and security. While the incredi-
ble value of this agency cannot be overstated, neither can the risks
posed by its vast capabilities. The broad scope of the agency's vigilant
efforts has the potential to threaten the legitimate rights of American
citizens, and appropriate checks must be in place.234
FISA provides a well-established legal framework that has pro-
tected the rights of American citizens from unwarranted government
surveillance since 1978. 235 Although it appears that this framework
recently may have been circumvented through a secret executive or-
der,236 warrantless surveillance of Americans is nothing new. 237 Gaps
in our legal protections have existed since FISA's enactinent. 236
The NSA's minimization procedures provide strong protection
for the rights of U.S. citizens under most circumstances, but they al-
low breaches to occur in situations that are arguably the most crucial.
Although the NSA is required to destroy information inadvertently
obtained about U.S. citizens in most cases, the current minimization
procedures allow the agency effectively to initiate criminal investiga-
tions by turning over such information to law enforcement if criminal
conduct is revealed. This places Americans at risk of criminal prosecu-
tion resulting from warrantless eavesdropping on their private tele-
communications. This should not be permitted. Although it may not
be practicable for the NSA to obtain a warrant in every case where
information about U.S. citizens may be inadvertently acquired, the
2" See United States v. Jones, 149 F. App'x 954, 959 (11th Cir. 2005); see also United
States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326, 330 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
254 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(providing a more fervent expression of this concept).
gas
	 RSA, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511, 2518, 2519, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829,
1841-1846, 1861-1862, 1871 (West 2001 & Stipp. 2005).
See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 2, at Al.
257 See supra notes 51-144 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 51-144 and accompanying text.
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heightened expectation of privacy provided by encrypted Internet
telephony should require additional limitations on what may be done
with such information after it is acquired.
USSID 18 must be redrafted to forbid the use of inadvertently
obtained information for the purpose of initiating criminal investiga-
tions against U.S. citizens unless exigent circumstances are presented.
By disallowing the use of such information for these purposes, the
government would be ensuring that the NSA stays focused on its pri-
mary mission—protecting the United States from terrorism and for-
eign intelligence operations—and not engaging in general criminal
investigations domestically. Under the current directive, the NSA has
an incentive to collect as much "inadvertently acquired" information
as possible. If the possibility of using such information to initiate un-
related criminal investigations were removed, the agency would cease
to have an incentive to collect information unrelated to its national
security mission. This would provide the agency with an incentive to
maintain its focus on foreign terrorism and counterintelligence, and
it would curb the temptation to stray into unrelated matters more ap-
propriately left to those charged with domestic law enforcement.
This solution would allow the NSA to protect U.S. national secu-
rity, while also enabling American citizens to communicate with foreign
acquaintances without fear. It would also have the benefit of restoring
public confidence in the NSA, effectively combating the perception
that the agency engages in frequent violations of the very rights it was
created to defend.
